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The uncovering of an international black market in nuclear technology in a world, threatened by state and non-state terrorism, should persuade all governments that humankind is edging closer towards global nuclear suicide. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the 'father' of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, which gave Pakistan nuclear parity with India in 1998, was pardoned by the Pakistani government after he confessed on television that Khan Research Laboratories had been selling nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea over the past fifteen years. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed El-Baradei, has called  it "the tip of the iceberg" and has warned that nuclear proliferation is a mortal danger and that "we risk self-destruction."

Investigations have revealed a wide, clandestine network, that has unwittingly involved a legitimate Malaysian company, Scomi Precision Engineering (SCOPE), which had manufactured 14 parts for centrifuges that have multi-purpose industrial uses, which also include uranium enrichment for the production of nuclear weapons-usable uranium. It has been established beyond doubt that the company was unaware that its products were being shipped to Libya for use in its now abandoned nuclear weapons programme. However, the episode underscores the need for greater vigilance by manufacturers, in determining the intent of their customers, and increased transparency by purchasers in declaring the destination and eventual application of dual-use technology.

There are many lessons to be learnt. Both the pardoning of Pakistan's 'national hero' and the muted response of the US administration reveal a mutual desire to avoid the destabilising of President Musharraf's government, an important ally of the US in the so-called "war on terrorism." It also sends a disturbing signal about American and Pakistani attitudes toward proliferation and shows up the double standards by which much of international diplomacy is practised all over the world. The other lesson is that strategic allies of the US receive special treatment.  For example, the war on Iraq was waged on the spurious grounds that it possessed weapons of mass destruction. The conclusion by the former US chief weapons inspector in Iraq, David Kay, that Saddam Hussein "got rid" of his chemical and biological weapons long before the invasion, underlines the point that Iran, Libya and North Korea posed a far greater threat than Iraq.

The failure to detect the existence of an international black market in nuclear technology for fifteen years has revealed weaknesses in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology. It has rocked the international community, particularly the United States. In a speech at the National Defence University in Washington on 11^th February 2004, President Bush outlined his continuing counter-proliferation strategy, calling for an expansion of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and announcing a US proposal to limit the number of countries permitted to produce nuclear fuel. The PSI, made up of another 'coalition of the willing' - Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States - will share intelligence, track suspect international cargo, search planes and ships, and seize weapons, missiles or equipment that raise proliferation concerns. There is no reference to the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) or the rights of freedom of navigation on the high seas and innocent passage through territorial waters without interference. The implication of this omission would be that some states may infer they have a right to interdict ships even when such a right does not exist. This lack of legal clarity could result in unjustified interdiction actions and international tensions over their legality, that could escalate into military conflict.

In addition, the PSI envisages direct action against middlemen, suppliers and buyers involved in proliferation networks, by shutting down laboratories, seizing their materials and equipment, and freezing their assets. A UN Security Council resolution is being proposed, which will require all states to criminalise proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders.

In order to close a loophole in the NPT and prevent governments from developing nuclear weapons under the cover of civilian nuclear programmes, there is a proposal that states may have reliable access to fuel at reasonable cost for civilian nuclear reactors, provided those states renounce uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, which are the two main paths to producing weapons-grade fuel. The forty nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group will also refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants. All states with civilian nuclear programmes will have to sign the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which will require them to declare a broad range of nuclear activities and facilities and submit to challenge inspections by the IAEA.

This nuclear fuel initiative is yet another extension of nuclear apartheid. The United States and the other nuclear weapon states will continue to exert their hypocritical righteousness and exceptionalism to possess and produce nuclear weapons, while denying other states access to the same weapons. It also reflects a discriminatory, pernicious "rogue state" approach to proliferation, instead of viewing non-proliferation as a global challenge, requiring global cooperation. It approaches the fuel issue exclusively from the viewpoint that it is a problem in non-proliferation. It is likely to prove counter-productive and stimulate the development of new sources of fuel supply.

The IAEA has made an alternative proposal to create an international, multilateral organisation to control the production of all nuclear fuel in the world, giving members of the organisation ownership and control over how it is used. The Bush administration has rejected the proposal because it would clearly stifle ongoing US plans to develop new nuclear weapons.

The international community is right to be concerned about the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMD) technology, but it must also seriously question the reasons for proliferation in a world that is threatened by militant religious fundamentalism and political extremism, fanned by the sense of injustice among the dispossessed and disempowered. Apart from material gains, Khan was also moved by his perception that the development of Muslim nuclear arsenals would correct the military imbalance between the West and the Muslim world.

We live in a disorderly, unequal world where security is still defined in military terms, where the rule of force is overtaking the rule of law, and where ethics and social justice are drowning in a sea of market forces. Time is running out for a world, increasingly menaced by a culture of violence and war, in an age where amoral science and technology claim neutrality and ignore the consequences of their actions in producing more and more destructive nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Fifty-eight years after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and fourteen years after the end of the Cold War, the nuclear weapon states still refuse to comply with their treaty obligations to disarm and the world continues to be threatened by their nuclear arsenals and the possibility of nuclear war or nuclear terrorism.  The NPT is in danger of unravelling because it is not only about nuclear non-proliferation. It is also about the elimination of nuclear weapons. The increasing threat we face today from proliferation stems from the stalemate in nuclear disarmament, because non-proliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin.

During the Cold War, nuclear proliferation was driven by the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and the race for nuclear supremacy between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, proliferation is being driven by the new nuclear and military policies of the United States, as articulated by the Bush administration in its 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and its National Security Strategy.

These new policies envision a permanent nuclear arsenal, a major expansion of the role of nuclear weapons, a new triad of capabilities that combine nuclear and conventional offensive strikes with missile defences, and a new nuclear weapons complex for the design, development, manufacture and testing of new warheads. In other words, any conventional war waged by the US could escalate into a nuclear war.

Moreover, by rejecting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the United States has signalled the beginning of the end of the non-proliferation regime and the start of a second nuclear age, as more and more states will choose to oppose nuclear apartheid and nuclear double standards. This could result in a dangerous nuclear free-for-all. The 1996 Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons enunciated the axiom of proliferation: The possession of nuclear weapons by any state stimulates other states to acquire them.

The world is a gloriously diverse and complex place, in need of a far greater understanding of the politics of culture and the culture of politics. Western attitudes to the East have long been shaped by its history of imperialism, and Western images and perceptions of the Arab and Muslim world are largely created by Western polemics. At the same time, many parts of the Arab and Muslim world are still submerged in the depths of obscurantism   and   religious misinterpretation and are disengaged from the modern world.

The pseudo-simplicity of the "war on terror" cannot be allowed to go uncontested. The merchandising of neo-conservative politics by the mainstream Western media continues to shape American foreign policy in ways that betray the great traditions and ideals of a great country. The solution to nuclear proliferation lies not in more discriminatory policies or the unilateral, pre-emptive use of illegal force, but in doing away with double standards and complying with treaty obligations and international law.

Dr. McCoy is Vice President of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST) and President of the International  Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)  which received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985

16 February 2004