Home • Publications • Projects • La Trobe IR • Journal • Conferences • Lectures & Papers • Profile • Resources • Search • Contact

Australia and the Impending War in Iraq

by Joseph A. Camilleri

January 27 was not to be 'D-Day'. On this almost everyone agreed. With the inspectors' interim report now behind us, it is clear that momentous decisions will be made over the next several weeks. At issue is not just the future of Iraq, or even peace in the Middle East, but the prospects for global security in years to come. All countries, regardless of their size, location or geopolitical circumstance, have a great deal at stake. Australia, perhaps more so than most.

Australia is in a highly anomalous situation. Almost from the outset the Howard government enthusiastically embraced Washington's call to arms. In so doing it joined a highly exclusive club. So exclusive that even now it is hard to find anyone else - other than Britain - who belongs to it. It does not include Canada or New Zealand, or virtually any government in Western Europe, the Middle East, Northeast or Southeast Asia. A few have given grudging acceptance to what they see as the inevitability of war, but none other than Britain and Australia have been willing to deploy military forces.

Why has the Australia government chosen to isolate itself so completely from the rest of the world? Even in Britain, where the Blair government continues to assert the right to take military action without a clear Security Council mandate, the tide of public opinion has swung decisively against such a course. Unease has since spread widely through the British Labour Party, and is now strikingly evident in the ranks of the Cabinet itself.

The reason for such a universally negative response to the proposed invasion of Iraq is not hard to discover. Governments, political, religious and even military leaders, writers, scholars and journalists in most parts of the world remain singularly unimpressed by the case for war. The Pope and the Archbishop of Canterbury have spoken on the matter on several occasions, each time with increasing firmness and anxiety about the likely consequences of unauthorised military intervention.

In Australia, the case against war with Iraq has been put by the leaders of all Christian churches, but perhaps most clearly and cogently by General Peter Gration, Chief of the Australian Defence Force during the Gulf War. The main argument for war - the need to disarm Saddam Hussein - is rapidly losing whatever credibility it may have once had. After several weeks of intensive investigations the UN inspection team (UNMOVIC) is far from reaching any alarming conclusions.

Neither the preliminary assessments offered by Hans Blix, UNMOVIC's Executive Chairman, nor UNMOVIC's daily inspection reports offer any credence to the British government's September 24 intelligence report (the 'Blair dossier'). Most of the sites named in the dossier have already been inspected by UNMOVIC, with no apparent evidence that they house weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Two items have been unearthed in recent days - 11 disused chemical warheads said to date back to the Iran-Iraq war and documents found in the home of an Iraqi nuclear scientist, probably linked to Iraq's previous uranium enrichment programme. Neither discovery provides the ammunition needed to build a case for 'material breach' of Security Council resolutions.

In all probability, the previous UN inspection team (UNSCOM) effectively dismantled Saddam Hussein's limited nuclear infrastructure, and little has since been done to bring it back to life. It is possible that Iraq still has a limited chemical and biological capability, and that it is sufficiently small, dispersed and camouflaged to evade quick detection. But as General Gration has pointed out, we need to keep in mind that biological weapons have a short shelf life, that tactical use of both chemical and biological weapons is extremely difficult, and that Iraq lacks the means for their strategic delivery. Moreover, Iraq has a fiercely secular government, and the likelihood of co-operation with al Qaeda or other Islamic fundamentalist organisations is remote.

Why, then, should Iraq be singled out when a number of governments have a far more advanced nuclear arsenal (e.g. Pakistan, India and Israel), and all of them with the capacity and in given circumstances the will to use it? Several other governments - not just North Korea - may already be building the infrastructure needed to embark on the same path over the next three to five years. One can only infer that US policy is governed by other imperatives.

The so-called humanitarian argument is, if anything, flimsier. Saddam Hussein's regime is certainly not a pleasant one. It has regularly used force and intimidation both against neighbours and against elements of its own population. It has an appalling human rights record. But many regimes over the last twenty or more years have had comparable or worse records. One need only mention Pol Pot, Pinochet, Idi Amin, Mobutu, Suharto, or a host of other tyrants in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. US governments have not as a rule proposed invasion in defence of human rights, not even in the case of the Rwandan genocide that saw 800,000 people butchered in the space of twelve weeks. And, just as well. Global intervention would be a recipe for global anarchy.

One can only infer that US policy on Iraq is governed by other imperatives. The planned military thrust into Iraq, regardless of the rhetoric with which it is cloaked, is seen by the vast majority of Arabs and by the Muslim world more generally as an attempt by the United States (to a lesser extent Britain) to establish strategic control of the entire Middle East, unimpeded access to cheap Middle Eastern oil, and a demonstrable capacity to remove from office any government likely to defy US preferences and priorities. For Bush and his advisers two other considerations may be pertinent: the need to complete the unfinished business of the Gulf War, and more importantly a desire to assume for the United States the role of global policeman in defiance not merely or even primarily of the UN, but of Western Europe which, for all its weaknesses, is emerging as America's principal economic rival and political critic.

The President's advisers may have also judged that given its parlous economic and military condition Iraq will be in no position to offer effective or prolonged resistance to the US advance. The United States can therefore confront Saddam in the confident expectation that it will achieve a quick victory and sustain few losses on the battlefield. Such a dramatic imposition of US will could be used to intimidate other existing or would-be rogue states, and apply additional pressure on recalcitrant friends and allies to accept the wisdom of Washington's grand design.

The question remains: Why should an Australian government associate itself with this approach? Why should it choose to send 1550 Australian military personnel, including elite SAS troops and a squadron of fighter jets, well before UN inspectors have completed their work? Why should it act in a manner that is so out of step with regional sentiment either among political elites or the wider public?

Two main reasons suggest themselves. First, the Australian prime minister and one assumes a good many, though by no means all, other members of Cabinet share the view that Iraq, even more starkly than Afghanistan, presents Australia with an opportunity to demonstrate its reliability as an ally of the United States. That so few other allies are prepared to offer comparable backing for Washington's rhetoric and actions merely serves to highlight the uniqueness of Australia's position. What many observers see as lack of judgment, the Howard government sees as integral to the policy it has consistently pursued since it assumed office in 1996.

Close alignment with the United States is no new development. It is but a variation on an old theme. Doing as the 'great and powerful friend' asks and committing forces far from our shores, even when the conflict poses no direct threat to Australia's security, is merely the premium attached to this insurance policy. The rights and wrongs of the conflict and the implications of military action whether for peace in the Middle East or for global security are in a sense tangential. The policy of 'forward defence' - in this case the despatch of military forces to the Gulf and possible military participation in the invasion of Iraq - is judged first and foremost in terms of its likely impact on the Australian-US alliance. Anything that cements the military and diplomatic relationship is seen as a positive achievement. The rhetoric of the 'deputy sheriff' doctrine may have been abandoned but not its substance.

There is, of course, more to the government's thinking than grand strategy. Domestic political considerations are crucial. An assessment has presumably been made that the Australian public, especially in the aftermath of September 11 and Bali, would support a strong military response. When a degree of public unease is detected, the tone of public pronouncements is suitably modulated, but the content remains essentially unchanged. The political strategy rests on two main assumptions: first that once Australian forces are committed public opinion will swiftly fall into line with government policy; and secondly - and perhaps more importantly - that the Labor opposition has no clear alternative to present, and that the government's forceful response will merely expose Labor's paralysis and internal divisions.

The Howard approach, it must be conceded, has been greatly assisted by the dearth of informed public discussion, and by the relative failure of other parties - not just the ALP - to offer a coherent analysis of the situation. Even the Greens and the Democrats, though they have unequivocally opposed the government's bellicose utterances and actions, have yet to articulate a clear set of principles that should govern Australia's handling of the complex issues posed by so-called 'rogue' behaviour on the one hand and US hegemonic ambitions on the other.

Three important principles need to be given much greater attention than has thus far been the case. First, the issue of weapons of mass destruction is a critical one, and Australia needs to confront it using all the leverage and insight at its disposal. One thing, however, is clear: the issue cannot be handled selectively or intermittently to suit the latest twists and turns of US official thinking. It requires a concerted approach which covers three groups of countries: those that are nuclear threshold states (Iraq is just one of several in this category); those which have recently acquired nuclear weapons or which have yet to declare their acquisition (India, Pakistan, Israel); and the five major nuclear powers, which are also the Permanent Five on the Security Council. Weapons of mass destruction will always pose a serious threat to global security until such time as all three groups of states agree to renounce them as an instrument of policy.

Second, in developing and executing policies based on mutual obligation, the international community must proceed in ways that strengthen rather than weaken the international rule of law. The United Nations as presently constituted has an important role to play. On the other hand, the United Nations generally and the Security Council in particular may need to be reformed in order that the rule of law may be more effectively and legitimately applied. Both in the short and longer term it is therefore essential that crucial international decisions reflect the widest possible participation in decision-making processes. One power, whatever its economic or military clout or pretensions to leadership, cannot decide for the rest of the world. Military intervention determined by the will of one great power merely sets the precedent for unilateral intervention by another - the United States today, China, Russia, Europe or even Japan tomorrow.

Third, a country like Australia, when responding to security challenges of the kind posed by Iraq, has everything to gain from acting in concert with other small and middle powers. At the very least, Australian governments must make it their business to consult with Asian and Pacific neighbours. In the case of Iraq, there is much to be said for a consultative process that brought Australia and New Zealand together with the ASEAN countries. Indonesia and Malaysia, two countries with large Muslim populations, are particularly well placed to take part in a dialogue on a comprehensive peace process in the Middle East. In time, such consultation might usefully contribute to a larger Europe-Asia initiative. Our place in the emerging Asian regional architecture would be far more secure than it is now if we made it our practice to consult and collaborate - not just in areas of narrowly defined self-interest (e.g. preventing asylum seekers from reaching our shores) but on issues of regional and global security.

In responding to the prospect of war in Iraq and for that matter to September 11 and Bali, Australia has been poorly served by its political leaders. But this is not cause for despair. In the end, it is for civil society to awaken to its responsibilities, to engage with the issues, and to make the political process far more transparent and more accountable. Though ominous clouds are rapidly gathering over Iraq, it may not be too late for Australia to play a more constructive role.

Joseph Camilleri is Professor of International Relations at La Trobe University and President of Pax Christi.

                                                            31 January 2003